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Abstract
In the paper we solve the general case of the Lucas (1990) optimal capital taxation model with
endogenous growth driven by endogenous learning. We prove Lucas (1990)s conjecture on zero limiting
capital tax and display the possibility of multiple equilibria (i.e., multiple BGPs) in the model.
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1 Introduction
Lucas (1990) contributes to examine the Chamley (1986)-Judd (1985) zero capital tax theorem in a model
with endogenous growth driven by human capital accumulation. In his well-known paper, he presents the
result of zero limiting capital tax for the case with exogenous human capital accumulation and then focuses
on quantifying the welfare cost of capital taxation for the U.S. economy. For the more general case with
endogenous human capital accumulation, however, he just conjectures that the zero limiting capital tax
result still holds, without working out the details of the Ramsey problem. Furthermore, the balanced growth
path is assumed (rather than proved) to be existent. It is useful and important to solve the Lucas (1990)
model completely, just like what Lucas had said in his paper: "It would be a useful but di¢cult task to
provide a full characterization of solutions to this maximum problem".
In the paper we want to solve the general case of the Lucas (1990) model, verify his conjecture on the result
of zero limiting capital tax and prove the existence of the balanced growth path. Acturally, it is not easy to
solve explicitly the general case because an integral equation (rather than a di¤erential or algebraic equation)
should be incorporated as another constraint in the Ramsey problem and the Lagrangian/Hamiltonian cannot
deal with it directly. To overcome this di¢culty, by following the literature on endogenous time preference,
such as Uzawa (1968), we dene a new state variable and transform the integral equation into a di¤erential
equation and an algebraic equation. Hence we can solve the model explicitly and prove Lucas (1990)s
conjecture. When proving the existence of the balanced growth path, we utilize the particular functional
forms of the production function, learning technology and the utility function used in the Lucas (1990)
model, and nd out that there may exist multiple equilibria (i.e., multiple balanced growth paths) with zero
capital tax.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the Lucas (1990) model with endogenous
learning. We solve the general case of the Ramsey problem and prove Lucas (1990)s conjecture in section
3. In section 4 we examine the existence of the balanced growth path and refer to the possibility of multiple
equilibria. Section 5 concludes.
2 The Lucas (1990) model with endogenous learning
In this section, we review briey Lucas (1990)s optimal capital taxation model with endogenous growth and
present the dynamic system of Euler equations describing the market equilibrium of the model economy.
Households. The representative household maximizes the objective functionZ
1
t=0
e ( )tU (c (t) ; x (t)) dt; (1)
subject to the ow budget constraint

k (t) = r (t) k (t) + w (t)u (t)h (t) + b (t)  c (t)  k (t) ; (2)
and human capital accumulation equation

h (t) = h (t)G (v (t)) ; (3)
where  (> 0) is time discount rate,  is population growth rate; c (t) is per capita consumption, k (t) and
h (t) are per capita stocks of physical and human capital, b (t) is per capita transfer payments from the
government; x (t) = (1  u (t)  v (t)), u (t) and v (t) are time for leisure, work and learning, with the total
time endowment 1 at each t; r (t) and w (t) are the interest rate and real wage net of taxes; the initial
values of stocks of physical and human capital k (0) and h (0) are exogenously given. The current period
utility function has the constant elasticity form, i.e., U (c; x) = (c' (x))
1 
= (1  ), and the learning/human
capital accumulation technology has the form of G (v) = Dv , with positive technology parameters D and
.
Application of the Pontryagins maximum principle of optimal control leads to the rst order necessary
conditions:
e ( )t
Uc (c (t) ; x (t))
Uc (c (0) ; x (0))
= exp

 
Z t
s=0
(r (s)  ) ds

; (4)
1
Ux (c (t) ; x (t))
Uc (c (t) ; x (t))
= w (t)h (t) ; (5)
w (t)h (t) = G0 (v (t))
Z
1
s=t
exp

 
Z s
v=t
(r (v)  ) dv

w (s)u (s)h (s) ds: (6)
Equation (4) tells that the marginal rate of substitution between consumption at time 0 and t must equal the
relative prices of these two goods. Equation (5) shows that the marginal rate substitution between leisure
and consumption must be equal to the real wage. Equation (6) is an integral equation displaying no arbitrage
for optimal income-directed time allocation in producing nal goods or accumulating human capital.
Firms. The representative rm employs capital k (t) and e¤ective labor u (t)h (t), produces the nal good
with the linearly homogenous production technology F (k (t) ; u (t)h (t)) = k (t)

[u (t)h (t)]
1 
,  2 (0; 1),
and maximizes its prot. Perfect competition ensures that both factors are paid their marginal products.
Hence,
w (t) = (1  )Fn (k (t) ; u (t)h (t)) ; r (t) = (1  )Fk (k (t) ; u (t)h (t)) ; (7)
where  is the tax rate on labor income and  is the tax rate on capital income.
Government. The government levies at-rate taxes on labor and capital incomes with full commitment
to nance its consumption, g (t), and transfer payments, b (t), and runs a balanced budget constraint,
g (t) + b (t) =

1  
r (t) k (t) +

1  
w (t)u (t)h (t) : (8)
Combining equations (2) and (8) and plugging (7) in it, we recover the social resource constraint
c (t) +

k (t) + k (t) + g (t) = F (k (t) ; u (t)h (t)) : (9)
Then, the marginal conditions (4)-(7), together with the equations of motion (3) and (9) for the two kinds of
capital, form a system of Euler equations that describes the competitive equilibrium of this model economy
given the initial stocks of physical and human capital.1
3 The Ramsey problem and zero limiting capital tax
In this section we formulate the Ramsey problem by utilizing the Primal approach developed by Atkinson
and Stiglitz (1980) and used by Lucas and Stokey (1983) and solve it by dening a new state variable and
changing the integral equation into a di¤erential equation and an identity.
Firstly, we integrate the ow budget constraint of the household and derive the present-value budget
constraint Z
1
t=0
exp

 
Z t
s=0
(r (s)  ) ds

[c (t)  w (t)u (t)h (t)  b (t)] ds = k (0) : (10)
Substituting (4) and (5) into (10) gives rise to the implementability conditionZ
1
t=0
e ( )t fUc (t) [c (t)  b (t)]  Ux (t)u (t)g ds = Uc (0) k (0) : (11)
Putting (4) and (5) into (6), we obtain the following key integral equation in the more general model with
endogenous learning
Ux (c (t) ; x (t)) = G
0 (v (t))
Z
1
s=t
e ( )(s t)u (s)Ux (c (s) ; x (s)) ds; (12)
which should be incorporated in solving the Ramsey problem. Therefore, the Ramsey problem is: maximize
(1) subject to (3), (9), (11) and (12). Notice that equation (12) is an integral equation which is hard to be
incorporated into a Lagrangian. To overcome the di¢culty, we dene a new state variable
m (t) 
Ux (c (t) ; x (t))
G0 (v (t))
: (13)
1 If setting the tax rates  and  equal to zero, these same equations also serve to characterize the rst-best allocation.
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Substituting it back into equation (12), we derive a di¤erential equation about m (t), namely,

m (t) = [    u (t)G0 (v (t))]m (t) : (14)
In solving the Ramsey problem, we can replace the integral equation (12) with equations (13) and (14).
Then we construct the Lagrangian for the governments maximum problem as follows:
L =
8<: e
 ( )tW (c (t) ; 1  u (t)  v (t) ;) + e(t)[    u(t)G0(v(t))]m(t)
+e(t)[m(t)G0(v(t))  Ux(c(t); x(t))]+e (t) [F (k(t); u(t)h(t))  c(t)  k(t)  g(t)] + e (t)G(v(t))h(t)
9=; ;
where
W (c (t) ; x (t) ;)  U (c (t) ; x (t)) +  [Uc (t) (c (t)  b (t))  Ux (t)u (t)] ;
and  is a nonnegative multiplier, constant over time, and strictly positive if it is necessary to use any
distorting taxes. Now we have three control variables c (t) ; u (t) ; v (t), three state variables k (t) ; h (t) ;m (t),
three Hamilton multipliers e (t) ; e (t) ; e(t) and one Lagrange multeplier e(t). By utilizing again Pontryagins
maximum principle of optimal control, we derive the following rst order necessary conditions:
c(t) : e ( )tWc(t) = e(t)Ucx(t) + e (t) ; (15)
u(t) : e ( )tWx(t) =  e(t)G0(v(t))m(t) + e(t)Uxx(t) + e (t)Fn(t)h(t); (16)
v(t) : e ( )tWx(t) =  e(t)u(t)G00(v(t))m(t) + e(t)[m(t)G00(v(t)) + Uxx(t)] + e (t)G0(v(t))h(t); (17)
m(t) : e(t)[    u(t)G0(v(t))] + e(t)G0(v(t)) =   e(t); (18)
k(t) : e (t) [Fk(t)  ] =   _e (t); (19)
h(t) : e (t)Fn(t)u(t) + e (t)G(v(t)) =   _e (t): (20)
To nd the limiting capital tax, we should derive the balanced growth path (henceforth, BGP). Suppose
that there exists a BGP. We want to nd a BGP satisfying: (1) _h=h = _c=c = _k=k = _g=g = _b=b = ;
(2),  (t), v (t) and x (t) = (1  u (t)  v (t)) are unalterable constants; and (3),
_e(t)=e(t) = _e(t)=e(t),
_e (t)=e (t) = _e (t)=e (t). From the functional form of the utility function U (c; x) = (c' (x))1  = (1  ) and
the denitions of m (t) and W (c (t) ; x (t) ;), we know that on the BGP,
_Uc(t)
Uc(t)
=
_Ucx(t)
Ucx(t)
=
_Wc(t)
Wc(t)
=  ; (21)
_Ux(t)
Ux(t)
=
_Uxx(t)
Uxx(t)
=
_Wx(t)
Wx(t)
=
_m(t)
m(t)
= (1  ): (22)
Combining equations (14) and (22) gives rise to
    uG0(v) = (1  ): (23)
Taking the logrithmic derivatives with respect to t on both sides of equations (15)-(17) and substituting
equations (18)-(22) into them, we know that on the BGP
 (  )   =
h
_e(t)
e(t)   

Ucx(t)  (Fk   )
e(t)
e(t)
i
Ucx(t) +
e(t)
e(t)
; (24)
 (  ) + (1  ) =
G0 (v)
2
m(t) +

_e(t)
e(t) + (1  )

Uxx(t) + [  (Fk   )]
e(t)
e(t)Fnh(t)
 
e(t)
e(t)G
0m(t) + Uxx(t) +
e(t)
e(t)Fnh(t)
; (25)
3
 ( )+(1 ) =
uG0 (v)G00 (v)m(t) +
h
_e(t)
e(t) + (1  )
i
[m(t)G00 (v) + Uxx(t)] +
h
( G)  e(t)
e(t)Fnu
i
e(t)
e(t)G
0 (v)h(t)
 
e(t)
e(t)uG
00 (v)m(t) + [m(t)G00 (v) + Uxx(t)] +
e(t)
e(t)G
0 (v)h(t)
:
(26)
The left-hand side of equation (24) is a constant, i.e.,  (  )  , which implies that the right-hand side
is also constant on the BGP. Suppose that the growth rate of e(t) is a constant, i.e.,   (Fk   ), that is,
_e(t)e(t)    =  (Fk   ); (27)
then the right-hand side is consant and equation (24) turns out to
Fk = + : (28)
Substituting equation (27) into equation (25) gives rise to
 (  ) + (1  ) =
G0 (v)
2
m(t) + [  (Fk   )]
h
Uxx(t) +
e(t)
e(t)Fnh(t)
i
 
e(t)
e(t)G
0m(t) + Uxx(t) +
e(t)
e(t)Fnh(t)
: (29)
Suppose that the ratio e(t)=e(t) satises
G0(v) =  
e(t)e(t) [  (Fk   )]: (30)
Then the right-hand side of (29) is also constant and equation (29) degenerates to equation (28). Substituting
equations (27) and (30) into equation (26) leads to
 ( )+(1 ) =
[  (Fk   )]
n
 
e(t)
e(t)uG
00 (v)m(t) + [m(t)G00 (v) + Uxx(t)]
o
+
h
( G)  e(t)
e(t)Fnu
i
e(t)
e(t)G
0 (v)h(t)
 
e(t)
e(t)uG
00 (v)m(t) + [m(t)G00 (v) + Uxx(t)] +
e(t)
e(t)G
0 (v)h(t)
:
(31)
Suppose the ratio e (t) =e (t) satises
( G) 
e (t)e (t)Fnu =   (Fk   ); (32)
then equation (31) also degenerates to equation (28). Combining equations (27), (28), and (30), we obtain
that
_e(t)e(t) =
_e(t)e(t) =   (  ) : (33)
Similarly, combining equations (19), (28), and (32), we have that
_e (t)e (t) = _e (t)e (t) =  (Fk   ) =  (  + ): (34)
Suppose that the economy approaches a balanced growth path satisfying the above three conditions.
In the next section, we will prove the existence of such a balanced growth path. Now we examine the
optimal capital income tax on the BGP. We have solved the Ramsey problem and found the steady state
equation (28). In reinvestigating the competitive equilibrium, we have derived the Euler equation (4). Taking
logrithmic derivatives on both its sides and substituting (7) and (21) into it, we have that on the BGP,
(1  )Fk = + : (35)
Combining (28) and (35), we know that
 = 0;
which shows that the limiting capital incme tax is zero, just as Lucas (1990) had conjectured.
4
4 Multiple equilibria: the existence of balanced growth paths
We examine the existence of the balanced growth path in this section. For this purpose, we let z (t) =
k (t) =u (t)h (t) to denote capital per unit of e¤ective labor and f (z)  F (z; 1) = z to denote production
per unit of e¤ective labor. Then a balanced growth path is described by the values of c=h, g=h, b=h, z, u, v
and  that satisfy:
u [f (z)  (+ ) z] =
c
h
+
g
h
; (36)
G (v) = ; (37)
+  = (1  ) f 0 (z) ; (38)
c
h
'0 (x)
' (x)
= (1  ) [f (z)  zf 0 (z)] ; (39)
  + (   1) = uG0 (v) ; (40)
g
h
+
b
h
= u [f (z)  zf 0 (z)] + zuf 0 (z) : (41)
These equations are the BGP version of the technology description (3) and (9), the marginal conditions
(4)-(7) and the government budget constraint 8). As is shown in Lucas (1990), we must treat one of the
four scal variables ( ; ; g; b) as endogenous, given the values of the other three. For simplicity, we set
government transfers b to be zero. As is shown in the Ramsey problem, we derive the limiting capital tax as
zero ( = 0). If taking  as given, then we only need to pin down the endogenous value of g=h on the BGP.
Plugging (41) into (36) to delete g=h, substituting (36) into (39) to delete c=h, and putting the assumed
functional forms of ', G, and F , we obtain the equation system about (u; v; z) as follows:
u

z   (+Dv) z

=

(1  ) (1  u  v)

+ u

(1  ) z ; (42)
+ Dv = z 1; (43)
  + (   1)Dv = uDv 1: (44)
Solving for z and u from equations (43) and (44) respectively, and substituting them into equation (42), we
have that
[  + (   1)Dv ] [+ Dv    (+Dv)]
Dv 1 (+ Dv) (1  )
=
[   (1  )] [  + (   1)Dv ] + (1  ) (1  v)Dv 1
Dv 1
;
which is equivalent to
f  (1  ) [(1 + )    1]g (+ Dv)
  (+Dv)

[  + (   1)Dv ] = (1  ) (1  ) (1  v)Dv 1 (+ Dv) :
This is a very complex nonlinear algebraic equation about v. With the help of appropriate guesses, we display
the possibility of multiple equilibria (i.e., multiple BGPs). Even though there may exist many BGPs, we
just list three ones as follows:
BGP 1. Let     + (   1)Dv = Dv . We solve it for v = [(  ) =D]
1=
. Substituting v into (43)
and (44), we have one BGP satisfying
(v1; u1; z1) =
 
  
D
1=
;



  
D
1=
;

+  (  )

1=( 1)!
;
with a balanced growth rate 1 =    (> 0).
BGP 2. Let   + (   1)Dv = (2   1)Dv . By the same procedure, we solve another BGP:
(v2; u2; z2) =
 
  
D
1=
;
2   1


  
D
1=
;

2  

1=( 1)!
;
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with a balanced growth rate 2 = (  ) =.
BGP 3. Let   + (   1)Dv = (3   1)Dv . Then we solve the third BGP:
(v3; u3; z3) =
 
  
2D
1=
;
3   1


  
2D
1=
;

3  
2
1=( 1)!
;
with a balanced growth rate 3 = (  ) =2.
5 Conclusion
In this paper, by introducing a new state variable and changing the integral equation constaint into a
di¤erential equation and an identity, we solve the Ramsey problem with endogenous learning brought forward
by Lucas (1990) and prove Lucas (1990)s conjecture on zero limiting capital tax. Furthermore, we solve the
balanced growth paths explicitly and show the possibility of multiple equilibria with zero capital tax.
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